Mele, Alfred R. Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behavior. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Pp. ix+ 272. $39.95 (cloth). Mele's main project is to give a causal account of human action that is sensitive to the variety of ways in which such action may come about. Chapter 2 argues that his sort of "causalist" account (according to which all action has an inten- tional component that reflects the reasons for which the action is performed and by which the action is caused) is compatible with "physicalism" (the view that every substance, event, or state of affairs is, or supervenes on, a physical substance, event, or state of affairs). Chapter 3 discusses the principle (held by Donald Davidson to be self-evident) that, if an agent wants to do x more than he wants to do y and he believes himself free to do either x or y, then he will intentionally do x if he does either x or y intentionally. Mele criticizes this principle but then proposes a complicated modification of it.
